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Abstract
We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both
ideological and distributive dimensions, and legislators' preferences are separable over the
two dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions
together, rather than oering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately. The
equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in
any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which
excludes the median legislator (as dened over the ideological dimension), in contrast
with a game where no distributive decision is being made. Moreover, in any stationary
equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of
being proposed and approved.
We show that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and consider exam-
ples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties. We discuss the
impact of political parties on the outcome.
JEL classication numbers: C78, D71, D72
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the equilibrium patterns of proposed and approved decisions, as
well as the winning coalition structure in a simple legislative game. The understanding
of such issues is fundamental to the understanding of the operation of a legislature,
committee, or the formation of a parliamentary government. The main focus of our work
is on the importance of relative ideological positions of in a legislative decision making
game. We begin by analyzing the equilibrium outcomes of the game without any external
party inuence, and then illustrate the usefulness of the model by considering the issue
of party formation and how external party inuence can alter the outcomes.
Our approach is to model the legislative procedure as a non-cooperative game, build-
ing on the seminal bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
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They considered a
non-cooperative legislative bargaining game and explicitly modeled the process by which
legislators are recognized, make proposals and vote on proposals. Despite the fact that
Baron and Ferejohn considered a pure bargaining setting where the decision was entirely
distributive, their non-cooperative approach and explicit focus on process allowed for
predictions in situations where voting cycles exist (and the core is empty), and thus
produced new insights relative to the existing spatial voting literature. The predictions
of the Baron and Ferejohn model are simple, intuitive, and provide insight into the give
and take present in a legislature and how the decision making depends on the specics
of the procedure.
Of course, the main limitation of considering such a pure bargaining model is that it
oers little predictive power concerning the specics of coalition formation (other than

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See also Baron (1989) and Harrington (198).
conrming Riker's (1962) minimal winning coalition ideas), and oers no insight into the
relationship between legislative behavior and the ideological positions of the legislators.
In order to provide insight into these issues we consider a legislature that must make
a decision about both an ideological (or public good) dimension, over which legislators
have single peaked preferences, and a purely distributive (or private good) dimension for
which each legislator prefers to have a larger amount allocated to his or her constituency.
We examine a random recognition rule where a legislator is randomly selected to make a
proposal. The legislator may make a proposal over either dimension or both dimensions,
and the proposal is then put to a vote. If the proposal fails to receive a majority of
the vote, the process is repeated. If the proposal receives a majority of the vote and it
involves both dimensions, then the game ends. If the proposal passes and only involves
one dimension, then the process is repeated with the restriction that new proposals can
only consider the remaining dimension.
In the context of this legislative game, we begin by showing that even though the
ideological and distributive issues may be considered separately, the equilibria will involve
a proposal and approval of both dimensions simultaneously. The ideological issues cannot
be divorced from distributive issues because of the usefulness of the distributive dimension
as an instrument for compromise. For example, in a legislature which is deciding on both
the level of gun control and a division of government spending across states or provinces,
it is useful to tie the consideration of these decisions together since bargaining over
the distribution of spending can be used for compromise on the decisions concerning gun
control. This becomes especially important when legislators' preferences vary in intensity
over the ideological dimension, as then there are signicant possibilities for compromise
and tradeo. The outcome will generally not be a median decision on the level of gun
control and separate bargaining over distribution of spending.
Once this interaction between the dimensions is explored, we provide results regarding
the structure of the equilibria of the legislative game. First, we show that every station-
ary equilibrium results in some level of randomization over approved decisions. Most
importantly, in any equilibrium there is more than one ideological position which has a
chance of being approved. The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward: Given
that only a majority is needed for approval, the choice of the proposal that a legislator
makes will depend on that legislator's ideological position. The set of other legislators
whose approval the proposer attempts to win depends on the legislator's ideological po-
sition, and the intensity of other legislators' preferences and their willingness to trade
o ideology for the distributive dimension. Given this heterogeneity, dierent proposers
will nd dierent groups of legislators to be attractive as potential allies in forming a
majority. This is in contrast with the homogeneous setting of Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Second, we examine the structure of the winning coalitions in a class of stationary
equilibria. In particular, we show that every legislator has a chance of being excluded
from the winning proposal, as well as being included in the winning proposal. This
means that no legislator is indierent among all the outcomes which have a probability
of approval in an equilibrium, and so there are some that they would like to vote yes on,
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and others that they would like to vote no on. The surprising aspect of this is that there
are necessarily some proposals which are made and approved which exclude the median
legislator. Thus, there are proposals which win approval of legislators whose ideological
positions are not adjacent, and this is true regardless of the relative locations and strength
of the ideological positions. There are two parts to the intuition behind this. One part
comes from the bargaining and is related to the intuition one obtains from the work
of Baron and Ferejohn (1989): including a legislator in too many proposals strengthens
their bargaining position and makes it relatively expensive to obtain their vote. The
other part of the intuition is that the expectation of what will happen if the proposal is
voted down is the important benchmark for what is needed to get agreement. Thus, the
attractiveness of an ideological proposal is measured relative to this expectation rather
than on an absolute scale. For instance, a legislator with an ideological position at
one extreme needs only worry about how the proposal he or she makes compares to the
expected continuation in order to win approval of a legislator with an opposite ideological
consideration, and may not have move dramatically away from that expectation in order
to win approval of the other legislator.
Along these lines, the results exhibit some intuitive comparative statics. The set of
proposals that are approved in an equilibrium generally exhibit some variation around
their expectation (which is the relevant continuation expectation in a stationary equilib-
rium). So, there are winning proposals with ideological positions both to the left and right
of the expected proposal. As distributive considerations are relatively less important to
legislators and ideology is relatively more important, both the ability to compromise and
the variation of the ideological dimension of the winning proposals decrease. In the limit,
the winning proposals converge to the median position. At the other extreme, as dis-
tributive considerations are relatively more important to legislators, there is more room
for compromise on ideology and correspondingly a larger variation along the ideological
dimension of the winning proposals.
Finally, the structure and variation in the equilibria lead to a natural role for political
parties. Given that legislators are not indierent among the possible outcomes in an
equilibrium, they may gain by forming a binding alliance with other legislators in the
form of a political party. We discuss how this view relates to and diers from related
analyses of political parties in legislative settings. We consider examples where sharp
predictions can be made concerning a stable political party, and examine the proposal
that would emerge in the presence of the party. We also show that there are examples
where there may be several political parties which could form and be stable (so that no
members would choose to defect and ally themselves with others to form a new party), and
examples where there are stable parties consisting of legislators with opposite extremes
in the ideological spectrum.
Before proceeding to the model, let us discuss the relationship of this work to two
other models which are closely related to the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) approach. Baron
(1991) extends the Baron-Ferejohn model to the case of two dimensional decisions where
agents have circular preferences over outcomes. This produces interesting insight into sit-
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uations where there are three bargainers, which can be of signicant use in understanding
government formation in a parlimentary system. However, the model turns out not to be
tractable with larger numbers of players or with more general preferences. Thus, little
can be said analytically about the general behavior of the equilibria and so is diÆcult to
use to analyze coalition formation and legislative behavior.
Calvert and Dietz (1996) note this diÆculty and take a dierent approach, still keeping
with the original Baron-Ferejohn one dimensional pure bargaining model, but allowing
legislators to care not only about their own share but also about the shares of others.
Their model is tractable, as there is a natural tendency to form coalitions with other leg-
islators about whose allocation you care most. This also allows for an analysis of party
formation (which we will come back to discuss later). An important dierence of the
Calvert and Dietz approach and the one we take here is in terms of the motivation for
forming coalitions. In their model this motivation comes from externalities in preferences.
In our approach it comes from relative ideological positions and convictions. These dif-
ferent approaches oer complementary views of coalition and ultimately party formation
and, as will become evident, dierent insights into coalition and party formation. We
also take a dierent point of view on what a party is and how it works, treating it as an
stable organization external to the game, rather than as a (non-stationary) equilibrium
phenomenon of the game. We oer a detailed discussion of this view.
Let us mention one nal, but central, motivation for including an ideological dimen-
sion in a legislative model. Ultimately, it is important to marry a model of the internal
workings of a legislature with models of elections of legsilators, as well as the interac-
tions of the legislature with other branches of government. As ideological considerations
are critical to understanding these relationships (especially the election process), it is
important to understand their role in the legislative setting.
2 The Legislative Game
Legislators
There are n legislators, where n  3 is an odd number.
Decisions
A decision is a vector (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) consisting of an ideological decision y and a dis-
tributive decision x
1
; : : : x
n
. The set of feasible public decisions is [0; Y ] where Y 2 [0; 1]
and the set of private decisions are those such that
P
x
i
 X where X  0. The set of
possible decisions is denoted D with generic element d 2 D.
In the case where Y = 0, the model simplies to that of Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
and so the X dimension captures decisions that are purely distributive with no particular
ideological component to them. In the other extreme case, where X = 0, the model is
4
one of a pure ideological decision as in a median voting model, and so the Y dimension
captures decisions that are public.
Preferences
Each legislator i has preferences over decisions that depend only on the public decision
and his or her own component of the private decision. So, preferences of legislator i are
represented by a utility function u
i
: [0; 1] IR
+
! [0; 1] that depends on y and x
i
. The
utility function, u
i
(y; x
i
), is nonnegative, continuous, and is strictly increasing in x
i
for
every y 2 Y . Also, u
i
is single peaked in y for every x
i
.
2
We denote the peak of u
i
by
b
y
i
.
Legislators evaluate randomizations over decisions through expected utility calculations.
The preference ranking of each legislator i over ideological decisions is separable
from the distributive decision. More formally, for any (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) and (y
0
; x
0
1
; : : : ; x
0
n
),
u
i
(y; x
i
) > u
i
(y
0
; x
i
) if and only if u
i
(y; x
0
i
) > u
i
(y
0
; x
0
i
). This restriction actually pro-
vides for stronger results since we will show that equilibrium behavior exhibits a strong
interaction between the dimensions, despite the separability of preferences.
Without loss of generality, order legislators so that
b
y
i

b
y
j
if i  j. In any case where
Y > 0, assume that
b
y
1
<
b
y
n
. Let
b
y
med
be the median of
b
y
1
; : : :
b
y
n
.
Legislators discount time at a rate Æ where 0 < Æ  1. So, their utility for reaching
an agreement (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
N
) at time t is Æ
t
u
i
(y; x
i
).
The Legislative Game
The legislative game
3
consists of a potentially innite number of sessions. Time is indexed
by sessions t 2 f1; 2; : : :g. At the beginning of each session a legislator is recognized at
random to make a proposal. Legislator i is recognized with probability p
i
> 0, where
P
i
p
i
= 1 and the recognition probabilities are the same in each session. Next, the rec-
ognized legislator proposes a decision (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
). (Shortly, we will consider a more
general version where the legislator may choose to make a proposal in only one dimen-
sion.) Then, in a xed order
4
(the same in each session) the legislators are sequentially
called on to vote `yes' or `no'. If a majority of legislators (at least
n+1
2
) vote `yes', then
the game ends and the decision (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) is taken. Otherwise the game proceeds to
the next session, where the process is repeated.
5
2
That is, there exists by
i
such that u
i
(by
i
; x
i
) > u
i
(y; x
i
) for every y 6= by
i
, and y
0
< y < by
i
or by
i
> y > y
0
implies u
i
(y; x
i
) > u
i
(y
0
; x
i
).
3
This game is consistent with the `closed rule' version of Baron-Ferejohn (1989).
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The order is not important to the results. A random or simultaneous order will support the same
equilibria. One dierence, however, is that a simultaneous vote will result in additional equilibria where
all legislators vote yes for an arbitrary proposal expecting that this is the case and thus having no chance
of being pivotal. Similarly a simultaneous vote can introduce equilibria where all legislators vote no for
the same reason. Such degenerate equilibria are not possible in the case in a subgame perfect equilibrium
of an ordered (roll call) vote.
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In some legislative settings there are restrictions on whether (or when) some issues can be reconsid-
ered once they are voted down. To the extent that dierent but related proposals can still be submitted,
the game above is still a good approximation. Also, there are many decisions that legislative rules
5
For the case that the game never ends, assign a default decision denoted (y
0
; x
0
1
; : : : ; x
0
n
).
For the case where Æ < 1 this is irrelevant. For the case where Æ = 1 it is conceivable
that the default (viewed as a status quo) would matter, but we will prove that this is not
the case.
Each legislator observes all the actions that precede any action he or she decides
upon, so that the game is one of perfect information and the denitions of strategies and
subgame perfection are standard.
Although, we will use the term legislative game in what follows, it should be clear that
the game above is also a useful model for committee interactions in a variety of dierent
settings (for instance, a faculty committee), as well as the formation of a government.
For more discussion for how such a model might t with the formation of a government,
see Baron (1989) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Stationary and Simple Equilibria
Generally, the set of equilibria can be quite large and complicated in a game such as the
one described above. Indeed, a `folk-theorem' type of result along the lines of Proposi-
tion 2 of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) holds here as well, where a large set of equilibrium
outcomes can be supported.
6
However, the types of strategies needed to support arbi-
trary sorts of outcomes are quite complicated and can be criticized on several grounds.
Baron and Ferejohn argue for limiting attention to equilibria involving stationary strate-
gies, based on focalness of such equilibria and the on the nite horizon of individual
legislators. Rather than repeat those arguments here, we refer the interested reader to
their discussion. (See also Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for further discussion in a game
theoretic bargaining context.)
A strategy is stationary if each legislator's continuation strategy is the same at the
beginning of any session, regardless of history. An equilibrium is stationary if it is a
subgame perfect equilibrium and each legislator's strategy is stationary.
7
In some situations strategies turn out to satisfy further restrictions in terms of the
number of proposals that a legislator randomizes over when called upon. A legislator's
proposal must win the approval at least
n 1
2
other legislators to become an equilibrium
outcome. For any given legislator there exist M = (n  1)!=[(n  1)=2)!]
2
sets of exactly
n 1
2
other legislators.
generally allow to be reconsidered, even if previously voted down. Take, for example, the ideological
dimension to be the overall size of a budget and the distributive dimension to be the percent of spending
allocated to dierent constituencies. As mentioned below the model may also be interpreted to be a
general model of committee behavior in a variety of settings, or a model of government formation where
such restrictions rarely apply.
6
Here there are restrictions on the ideological outcomes that can be supported as depending on the
size of (or relative preference for) X . But, with large enough X and Æ, any outcome can be supported
in subgame perfect equilibrium.
7
Of course, non-stationary deviations are allowed when applying the denition of equilibrium.
6
A simple equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium in which (1) each legislator when
called on to propose randomizes over at most M proposals, and (2) each such proposal
can be identied with a distinct C such that i =2 C, #C =
n 1
2
and the legislators in C
(and perhaps others) vote `yes' on the proposal.
Note that a simple equilibrium does not require that the sets of legislators who approve
two dierent proposals by i be distinct as i may make proposals that are approved by
supermajorities.
3 Benchmarks
Let us begin with a result for the case where X = 0.
Benchmark If X = 0 and Æ = 1 for each i, then in any stationary equilibrium
b
y
med
is proposed and eventually approved with probability one. Furthermore, there exists a
simple equilibrium in which any recognized legislator in any session proposes
b
y
med
and it
is approved by all legislators. Also, for any  > 0 there exists Æ < 1 such that if Æ  Æ,
then the (possibly random) outcome of any stationary equilibrium is within  of
b
y
med
(with
probability one).
The above benchmark shows that in the purely ideological case, any stationary equi-
librium outcome
8
is close to the median legislator's ideological ideal point. The intuition
is that a proposal too far away from the median legislator's ideal point should not win
approval, given that the median and legislators to the other side can wait and do better.
A detailed proof is oered in the appendix.
The other extreme benchmark is the purely private case examined by Baron and
Ferejohn (1989).
Benchmark (Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). If Y = 0, there are equal probabilities of
recognition, and u
i
(0; x
i
) = x
i
for all i, then in any stationary equilibrium each legis-
lator has an expected distributive allocation of
X
n
. Furthermore, there exists a simple
equilibrium in which any recognized legislator proposes a share X(1  Æ
n 1
2n
) for him or
herself, and Æ
X
n
to each of a randomly selected
n 1
2
other legislators, and this is approved
by these randomly selected legislators.
In this benchmark we see the pure bargaining aspect where agents are oered some-
thing which makes them indierent between voting yes now and waiting for the con-
tinuation, with the randomly chosen proposer keeping the excess. The result extends
to situations where the probabilities of recognition are not quite equal (with some ad-
justments necessary in the probabilities of who to propose to). This follows from the
8
In this case, it is reasonable to conjecture that this is true of any subgame perfect equilibrium,
although this conjecture is not relevant for comparison in this work.
7
balancing that goes on in the purely distributive game: a legislator always wants to
make an oer to the cheapest (in terms of expectations) other legislators. This keeps any
single legislator from having too high an expectation since in that case other proposers
would not want to oer that legislator anything. Clearly, if a single legislator has an
overwhelming probability of being recognized then this reasoning breaks down.
4 Agenda Setting with both Ideological and Distribu-
tive Decisions
We now move to the general case of both ideological and distributive decisions. First,
we show that it is without loss of generality that we restrict the game to one where
proposals are made over both ideological and distributive decisions simultaneously. That
is, we show that in a game where the proposer has a choice of whether to propose on just
one dimension at a time or on both simultaneously, he or she chooses to propose on both
dimensions simultaneously (except in certain degenerate situations where the outcome is
equivalent in any case).
A More General Legislative Game
Consider the following legislative game. The structure of the game is the same as the
one described previously, except that the proposer may choose to propose a decision in
both dimensions, or may choose to propose a decision in either of the single dimensions.
In the case where a proposal is made and approved which involves just one dimension,
then that decision is xed and the game is continued with a new random recognition of
proposer to decide on the remaining dimension. The denition of stationary strategy is
extended so that an agent's strategy can depend on the previously approved proposal of
one dimension if there is one.
Proposition 1 Consider any stationary equilibrium of the general legislative game with
concave utility functions. If Æ < 1, then the game ends in the rst session with an
approved proposal that involves both dimensions. If Æ = 1, then for any stationary equi-
librium, there exists a stationary equilibrium with exactly the same probability over even-
tually approved decisions which ends in the rst session. Moreover, if Æ = 1, then some
proposal is approved (with probability 1) in the rst session, and any proposal which is ap-
proved and does not involve both dimensions has the distributive dimension proposed and
approved in the rst session and then the median proposal approved in some subsequent
session.
Note that the last case is non-generic as it not only depends on Æ = 1, but also requires
special congurations of preferences. Generally, there is compromise to be made and we
should expect the decisions to be taken together. This is detailed in Proposition 5.
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For the case of Æ < 1, the fact that a decision on both dimensions is approved in
the rst period is not surprising, as there is a loss to waiting. The more interesting case
is when Æ = 1. Once a proposer has the oor, it is in his or her interest to propose a
distributive decision that will be approved, as otherwise they may be excluded in what
follows. The fact that they will choose to also propose an ideological decision is where
the importance of compromise comes in. If only the distributive decision is made and
cannot be changed, then in what follows Benchmark 1 will apply and we should expect
the median ideological decision to be taken. Thus, any compromise that is to be made
must be made simultaneously with the distributive decision.
For the remainder of the paper, given the equivalence between the outcomes of the
two games established by Proposition 1,
9
we restrict our attention to the game where
legislators propose both dimensions simultaneously.
5 Winning Proposals and Coalitions
We now provide a sequence of results which describe properties of simple and/or station-
ary equilibria.
The proposition below establishes the existence of simple equilibria. This is important
since otherwise the analysis which follows could be vacuous. It is also interesting in that
it demonstrates that despite the potential complexity of the game, there always exists a
set of simple strategies that legislators can follow that are optimal with respect to each
other.
Proposition 2 If u
i
is concave for each i, then there exists a simple equilibrium. More-
over, if each u
i
is strictly concave then all stationary equilibria are simple.
Standard game theoretic results concerning the existence of equilibrium do not apply
here given the continuum of actions and the stochastic nature of the game,
10
and moreover
because we are establishing existence of simple equilibrium. Thus we oer a direct proof
of Proposition 2 in the appendix.
11
We remark that the proof of Proposition 2 does not
rely on the separability of preferences.
Next we establish some basic characteristics of the equilibria.
Proposition 3 In any stationary equilibrium:
9
Although not stated in the proposition, it is clear that any equilibrium of the restricted game is also
an equilibrium of the more general game.
10
The game may be viewed as stochastic by coding the random choice of proposer into the state, and
also by having dierent states depending on whether or not a proposal has been accepted in the past.
11
Independent work by Banks and Duggan (1998) oers a similar result, as well as a result like Lemma
1.
9
 if utility functions are concave, then the legislative game ends in the rst session
(even if Æ = 1)
 any approved decision distributes X among an exact majority,
 if the utility functions are concave, then the equilibrium is independent of the default
decision (even if Æ = 1).
The fact that the legislative game ends in the rst session is fairly clear for the case
that Æ < 1, but for the case of Æ = 1 the argument is a bit more subtle as one can
imagine a legislator being indierent between the approved proposals and thus willing to
make a realistic proposal with probability less than 1, with the expectation that sooner
or later it will be made and approved. The key to the proof comes from the following
propositions which establish a certain heterogeneity in equilibrium proposals, and show
that any proposer has a chance of being excluded from some proposal. This last fact
breaks indierence so that a recognized legislator strictly cares to propose a decision that
will be approved.
The fact that X is distributed among an exact majority, reaÆrms the logic of Riker
(1962) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
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Note that this depends on the closed rule
nature of the legislative game, and would not necessarily hold in an open rule version
where ammendments can be proposed. Such ideas are explored in Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) and not reconsidered here.
Finally, the fact that the equilibrium is independent of the default decision when
Æ = 1, is again related to some of the reasoning which is presented below. Each legislator
will have some chance of being excluded from a winning proposal, which induces a form
of impatience when they have a chance to propose. This (induced) impatience makes the
default outcome irrelevant.
Legislators have well-dened ex ante expected utilities for a given strategy prole.
Given the stationarity, at any point in the legislative game these expected utilities also
represent the expectated utility of the continuation, conditional on the current proposal
not being approved. We generally denote these by v
i
. The following denitions identify
how a legislator ranks a proposal relative to the continuation.
A proposal (y; x
1
; : : : x
n
) excludes legislator i (relative to v
i
) if u
i
(y; x
i
) < v
i
:
A proposal (y; x
1
; : : : x
n
) includes legislator i (relative to v
i
) if u
i
(y; x
i
)  v
i
:
Note that the denition of `exclude' and `include' is made relative to the legislator's
preferences and not their voting behavior. It is possible in equilibrium for a legislator
to vote `yes' on a proposal when they prefer the continuation, provided they are in a
12
In fact, this idea appears in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
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situation where they are certain that the proposal will be approved regardless of their
vote. That is, if a proposal has received or will receive a majority independent of a
given legislator's vote, then he or she will be indierent between voting `yes' or `no.'
Nevertheless, we still have information about the legislator's preferences and thus know
how they would vote if they were to cast the decisive vote, which is the idea behind the
denitions of being `excluded' or `included.'
Proposition 4 Suppose that legislators' utility functions are concave. There exists Æ < 1
such that for all Æ  Æ in any simple equilibrium for every i there is a positive probability
that a proposal is made and approved which excludes i. Furthermore, if Æ = 1 then this
is true of every stationary equilibrium.
One implication of the above proposition is that the median is excluded from some
proposal. This means that in any stationary equilibrium there is a positive probability
that a proposal wins the approval of (and includes the members of) a disjoint coalition.
In Proposition 4, it is not clear that the exclusion of a legislator involves anything
more than the distributive dimension, which would simply follow the logic of Baron
and Ferejohn (1989). In fact, there are interesting tradeos occuring in the ideological
dimension as well. The following proposition makes this point clear.
In what follows, let us restrict attention to quasi-linear utility functions. A legislator's
preferences are said to be quasilinear if there exists a single peaked u
i
: [0; 1] ! [0; 1]
such that u
i
(y; x
i
) = u
i
(y) + x
i
. The quas-linear preferences permit a more transparent
presentation of the following proposition. They are not necessary, but without this
assumption the extension of the following denition is more complicated.
We say that preferences admit local compromise if there exists some exact majority
C  N such that
b
y
med
is not a local maximum of
P
i2C
u
i
(y).
13
The above condition is a very weak one. It states that there exists some majority
coalition that could improve its overall utility by moving the ideological decision slightly
away from the median decision.
Proposition 5 Suppose that there are equal probabilities of recognition, and legislators'
preferences are quasi-linear and admit local compromise. Then in any stationary equi-
librium there is more than one y (and thus more than one proposal) that has positive
probability of being an equilibrium decision.
One of the important implications of Proposition 5, when compared with Benchmark
3 is that the possibility of joint consideration of the two dimensions impacts the outcome
on each dimension. Note that this true even though agents have additively separable
13
For any  > 0 there exists y such that jy   by
med
j <  and
P
i2C
u
i
(y) >
P
i2C
u
i
(by
med
).
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preferences, and so even when the dimensions are completely independent. Thus, this
diers from results in the spatial model where agents have circular or elliptical prefer-
ences, as in Enelow and Hinich (1984). There, the cardinal impact of changes in one
dimension depends on the choice in the other dimension, and so there is some interaction
between dimensions. In particular, how much a legislator cares about one dimension
versus another can depend on the location in the space.
14
Proposition 5 does not indicate what equilibrium implications are for the distributive
dimension. As illustrated in the examples that follow, the distribution may be quite
asymmetric depending on the relative ideological intensities of the legislators.
6 Comparative Statics
So far we have established a number of general properties of simple (and in many cases
stationary) equilibria, which under the assumption of concave utility functions are loosely
summarized as follows.
 Simple equilibria always exist and in such an equilibrium:
 Both dimensions will be considered together and a decision will be approved in the
rst session.
 Each legislator is excluded from some decision that has a chance of being approved.
 If preferences admit local compromise, then there are at least two dierent ideo-
logical decisions that have a chance of being approved.
In order to take our understanding further, we now examine some comparative statics.
First, we develop a result that allows one to examine limiting behavior, and to draw
conclusions from the Benchmarks we presented earlier. Second, we consider a specic
parametric example of the model with three legislators, and examine changes in the
equilibrium as the intensity of ideological preferences and locations of ideal points vary.
The following lemma shows that the set of simple equilibria are well behaved as one
varies the set of parameters of the legislative game. The lemma is also an integral part
of the proof of Propositions 2 and 4.
Lemma 6 Let (Æ
k
; Y
k
; X
k
; u
k
1
; : : : ; u
k
n
)! (Æ; Y ;X; u
1
; : : : ; u
n
), be a converging sequence
of discount factors, ideological intervals, distributive intervals, and preference proles,
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For instance, if preferences are circular, then it is almost always true that u
i
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i
)   u
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) 6=
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i
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with corresponding simple equilibria `
k
.
15
Choose any convergent subsequence of the equi-
libria and let its limit be `.
16
Then ` is a simple equilibrium of the legislative game for
(Æ; Y ;X; u
1
; : : : ; u
n
),
Although the lemma is technical in nature, establishing upper-hemicontinuity of the
simple equilibrium correspondence, its has important implications for limiting compara-
tive statics. For example, Benchmarks 1 and 2 can be used to understand what happens
when X becomes relatively large or small in consideration compared to Y . Consider the
case where Æ = 1. As the size of X goes to zero, then simple equilibria are close to
one where all proposals involve
b
y
med
, as in Benchmark 1. As the size of Y goes to zero,
then simple equilibria are close to pure bargaining ones analyzed by Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), as in Benchmark 2.
To gain a better understanding for the intermediate cases, where both X and Y are
important considerations and there is a possibility for compromise, let us consider a few
examples.
There are three legislators. Normalize by setting Y = 1, and for simplicity restrict
attention to the case where Æ = 1 and legislators have an equal probablity of recognition,
p
1
= p
2
= p
3
. Label leglislators in order of their peaks so that
b
y
1
= 0
b
y
2
=
b
y
med
, and
b
y
3
= 1. The preferences of legislator i are represented by  b
i
jy 
b
y
i
j+x
i
. Thus, legislators
care about the distance of y from
b
y
i
in a linear fashion.
Say that i proposes to j if the proposal by i includes j and excludes the remaining
legislator. Let y
ij
; x
ij
denote the decision proposed by i when proposing to j, and a
i
j
denote the probability that i proposes to j.
There is a unique stationary equilibrium (and thus simple equilibrium) which is de-
scribed in the appendix. We illustrate it here for specic cases.
Example 1: b
1
= 1, b
2
= 3, and b
3
= 6.
In this case there is a cycle where legislator 1 proposes to legislator 2, legislator 2
proposes to legislator 3, and legislator 3 proposes to legislator 1.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
17
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N
) are admissible. Simple equilibrium strategies may be set in a nite dimensional Euclidean
space, as outlined in the proof of Proposition 2.
16
Since there may be multiple simple equilibria, the sequence may not converge. However, any cluster
point of the sequence will be a simple equilibrium.
17
In each of the examples that follow, it must be that X is small enough so that 0  y
ij
 1. A bound
on X then follows directly from the given expressions.
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, x
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y
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b
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+
X
6
, x
23
= (0; X; 0)
y
31
=
b
y
med
+
X
2
, x
31
= (X; 0; 0).
Note that the equilibrium exhibits the properties that each legislator is excluded
from some decision and there are several ideological decisions that are possible. Also, the
decisions are eÆcient for the two legislators in question in that X goes to the legislator
who cares less about ideology, and Y lies between the peaks of the two legislators.
There are some other interesting things to note.
First, the ideological decisions are all described relative to
b
y
med
(and for instance,
shifting y
1
or y
3
while preserving the ordering of ideal points actually has no eect).
Keeping all else constant, if we shift
b
y
med
then the equilibrium shifts completely as is,
without changes in the relative positions of each decision. This illustrates an anchoring
eect of the median benchmark. In the absence of any X (or as we can see by letting
X ! 0 in the equilibrium), the decision would be the median yhm. Thus all compromise
occurs relative to that anchoring position, regardless of whether it is closer to the left or
the right.
Second, the range of the ideological decisions (y
ij
's) increases as X increases. Larger
X permits greater tradeo and thus results in a larger dispersion of ideological choices.
In the extreme, as X becomes very large, proposed y's would always be either
b
y
2
or
b
y
3
,
depending on the coalition.
Third, there is a 1/3 chance that the decision is made by the coalition comprising
legislators 1 and 3, who are not ideologically adjacent. This particular coalition has a
nice intuition: it is the legislator with the most intense ideological preferences proposing
to the legislator with the least intense ideological preferences, who thus oers the best
compromise, even though their ideological positions are the most extreme. An important
thing to note here is that it is the expected continuation proposals that are the anchor
for the bargaining. From 3's perspective, both legislators 1 and 2 are to the left of where
3 would like the outcome to be, and 3 will end up oering the full X to whomever he
proposes to in order to get the most favorable Y position.
18
Some aspects of the above equilibrium generalize to other cases and some do not. The
full description of all cases is outlined in the appendix. In each case where b
1
< b
2
< b
3
, 1
always proposes to 2. As 1 will always get the full X in such a proposal, 2 has less intense
ideological preferences and oers a better y position for 1. More generally, however, 2
and sometimes 3 may mix over who they propose to. For 2 it is a choice of being the
18
Here 3 would get exactly same outcome by proposing to 2 instead of 1, given the current expectations.
However, if 3 proposed to 2 then 2's expectations would be higher and 3 would have to move y closer to
by
med
to get 2's approval. So the only equilibrium has 3 proposing to 1.
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relatively less ideological legislator in a proposal to 3, or the relatively more ideological
legislator in a proposal to 1 - and in many cases in equilibrium 2 can be indierent. Also,
as mentioned above, 3 would like to propose to the cheaper of the two other legislators.
It turns out that as b
2
increases relative to b
1
, then 3 strictly prefers to propose to 1.
However, as b
2
decreases, then 3 becomes indierent and mixes in equilibrium.
Let us examine other cases to get a feel for the types of behavior that are possible in
equilibrium.
Example 2: b
1
= 1, b
2
= 5, b
3
= 6.
Legislator 1 proposes to legislator 2, legislator 2 mixes over proposing to the other
two, and legislator 3 proposes to legislator 1.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
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y
med
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= (X; 0; 0)
y
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b
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= (X
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b
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, x
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= (0; X; 0); a
23
=
21
25
y
31
=
b
y
med
+X
18
43
, x
31
= (X; 0; 0).
In this case, 2 mixes in equilibrium between proposing to 3 and proposing to 1. Note
that 2's proposal to 1 involves a split of the X. This happens because 2 is able to set
y =
b
y
med
and so cannot improve on this dimension.
Note also that compared to equilibrium 1, having more intense ideological preferences
has helped agent 2: the proposals are all better for 2 than the corresponding proposals
in Example 1. The intuition for this is that the ideological dimension has become more
important, moving the relative position of the y proposals closer to the median. The dis-
tribution of the X dimension is determined by the ordering of the ideological intensities,
but not the exact intensity.
Example 3: b
1
= 4, b
2
= 5, b
3
= 6.
Legislator 1 always proposes to legislator 2, legislator 2 mixes over proposing to the
other two, and legislator 3 mixes over proposing to the other two.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
y
12
=
b
y
med
, x
12
= (X
70
81
; X
11
81
; 0)
y
21
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b
y
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, x
21
= (X(
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=
4
5
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y
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=
b
y
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, x
32
= (0; X; 0), a
32
=
4
9
.
Note that in this case, both legislators 2 and 3 mix. Compared to Example 2, legislator
3 sees less advantage to proposing to legislator 1 as the ideological intensities of leglislators
1 and 2 are now closer, and is thus willing to mix over proposing to 1 or 2.
Example 4: b
1
= 1, b
2
= 1:25, b
3
= 6.
This turns out to be exactly the same as Example 3. This illustrates that it is only the
relative intensity of 1 and 2's ideological preference that matters in equilibrium. This is
true since 3 will never get any X in the proposals (given the intensity of his preferences)
and so it is only the relative willingness to compromise of the other legislators that
matters.
Examples where the ordering over b
1
, b
2
, and b
3
changes, oer similar insight.
Example 5: b
1
= 5, b
2
= 4, b
3
= 6.
Legislator 1 mixes over proposing to the other two, legislator 2 proposes to legislator
3 and legislator 3 mixes over proposing to the other two.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
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y
med
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7
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12
=
3
4
y
13
=
b
y
med
+X
1
8
, x
12
= (X; 0; 0), a
13
=
1
4
y
23
=
b
y
med
+X
1
8
, x
23
= (0; X; 0),
y
31
=
b
y
med
+X
7
8
, x
31
= (X; 0; 0), a
31
=
1
2
y
32
=
b
y
med
+X
7
8
, x
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=
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2
.
Note that this example is similar to Example 3 except that the intensity of legislators
1 and 2's preferences are reversed. Correspondingly the identity of which of these two
mixes is reversed.
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7 Political Parties
In the above examples, if two legislators were to get together before the legislative game
and bind themselves to cooperate with each other, then they could strictly improve over
what they expect in the equilibrium. Thus, the legislative game oers an explicit reason
for legislators to try to form such binding agreements, and in turn provides an opportu-
nity for political parties to oer improvement. This motivation for party formation was
developed in a legislative bargaining context by Baron (1989 and 1991).
19
Let us explore
what insight our model has to oer to the specics of party formation.
Krehbiel (1993) provides an important set of issues to be analyzed in a model of party
formation. His central point is that similarities in preferences or other motivating fac-
tors may naturally result in voting patterns that appear consistent with party behavior,
independent of the party's existence. Thus, it is important to distinguish between \party-
like" behavior and signicant changes in behavior due to parties. The idea being that
one might observe something which appears to be party behavior, but really matches
the natural underlying equilibrium behavior of the individuals in any case. In such a
situation, the fact that there exists something labelled a `party' is a natural result of the
incentives of individuals to vote similarly, and not something that externally aects the
outcome.
Calvert and Dietz (1996) point out that while the Baron (1991) model is in principle
well suited for an analysis of party and party-like behavior, it is close to intractable. Thus,
Calvert and Dietz (1996) propose a variation on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model
where they allow legislators to have preferences over the distributive allocations going
to others as well as themselves. This turns out to be more tractable and in particular,
Calvert and Dietz demonstrate a natural aÆnity for legislators who care about each
other's allocations to vote and propose closely together. Thus, they provide a benchmark
of party-like behavior, that consistent with Krehbiel's thesis, appears consistent with a
party organization even though there are no binding forces.
Calvert and Dietz (1996) do not model parties, and thus do not contrast party behav-
ior with party-like behavior, but they outline a method for doing so in future research.
Their suggestion is to examine non-stationary equilibria in the context of their game,
and use that as the model of a party organization. To the contrary, we argue that this
would not be a model of party behavior, but again a model of party-like behavior. A
non-stationary equilibrium, just like a stationary equilibrium, is entirely self-enforcing.
There is no outside force necessary to induce players to follow the prescribed behavior.
If one believes that non-stationary equilibria are plausible, then no party is needed|
19
The underlying ideas have a rich history and are in part the motivation for the early literature
on cooperative game theory which was tied to what cooperating players could earn in non-cooperative
games, again dating to von Neumann and Morgenstern. In the political science literature, there are a
variety of motivations for party formation of which some representative references are the classics by
Duverger (1954) and Riker (1962), and recent analyses of the role of parties in legislative contexts such
as Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991). Most relevant for our analysis are
papers by Krehbiel (1993) and Calvert and Dietz (1996).
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simply knowledge of the equilibrium strategies themselves. Moreover, the non-stationary
behavior needed to establish folk-theorem like results is often recursive. Thus, we argue
against the idea that non-stationary equilibrium should be interpreted as party behavior,
and stationary equilibrium play should be interpreted as party-like behavior.
Instead, our approach to modeling the party as an inuence on the legislative game
is to treat the party as an organization that is external to the game and through rewards
and punishments can enforce behavior that would otherwise not be observed in the game.
Thus, we stick with stationary equilibrium as the benchmark for the behavior in the game
in the absence of any external force, and compare it to a situation where an external force
is present. As an example, by controlling things such as committee appointments and
campaign funding (or intangeables like brand-recognition and reputation as suggested
in Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991)) a political party can serve as a device that binds
legislators to following certain strategies, which they would otherwise not choose to.
This can in turn improve their legislative performance.
One might reply to this view by saying that if one enlarges the scope of the model to
be a much larger game including committee formation, campaigning, and elections, etc.,
then the party is again simply an equilibrium phenomenon and does not dier from what
players naturally would like to do. With this we would have to agree. However, this is
a version of Krehbiel's point taken absurdum. It is useful to distinguish the behavior of
political players inside institutions such as a legislature or an election where there are well
dened rules which lend naturally to equilibrium modeling techniques, from the general
political arena. We argue that viewing a political party as an organization that operates
in the general political arena, and has an ability to inuence play inside a legislative
body, is a reasonable and productive modeling choice.
Let us now reexamine the examples in the last section in the context of party forma-
tion.
A party is modeled as a binding agreement among the members of the party to act
as one player in the legislative game. This generally poses diÆcult questions about how
to model the decision of the party regarding how to act in the legislative game. As a
rst step in this direction, restricting our attention to the setting of the examples in the
last section, however, considerably simplies things and results in natural ways to model
party behavior.
Consider two legislators who are forming a party. The party will generate benets
for them relative to the legislative game without any parties. They must split these
benets in some way. For instance, they could choose a platform that would give all the
benets to the rst legislator and leave the second indierent between being in the party
or playing the straight legislative game. Similarly, they could reverse this, or they could
end up somewhere in between. How these relative benets are split implicitly determines
the behavior of the party (and vice versa). So let us analyze this splitting.
18
The feasible pairs of gains in utility relative to the disagreement outcome (of the game
without any parties) form a nice closed and convex set, as in the classical bargaining
analysis of Nash. We use the Nash bargaining solution as a prediction for the surplus
split among the party members.
20
In the case where the possible Pareto optimal utility
combinations for the party form a linear frontier, this ends up giving each of the two
party members half of their maximal (potential) surplus relative to threat point of no
party.
Now, given an idea of how a given party will act, and what utilities it will generate
for its members, we can step back and ask which parties are most likely to form. In
particular, we can look for a (core) stable party structure such that neither legislator in
the resulting party would rather be in another party.
In particular, say that a party is stable if there is no other majority party for which all
of its members are strictly better o. This denition applies for the case of 3 legislators,
but can be extended to more in the natural way, allowing for the possibility of multiple
(and minority) parties.
Let us illustrate this approach in some detail by looking back at the examples of the
previous section.
Example 1 Revisited: b
1
= 1, b
2
= 3, and b
3
= 6.
Recall that legislator 1 proposes to legislator 2, legislator 2 proposes to legislator 3,
and legislator 3 proposes to legislator 1, and:
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The expected utilities from the equilibrium are:
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med
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The following observation is helpful in mapping out the range of possible utility
combinations that a party can generate for its members, and holds more generally.
20
We do not model the explicit bargaining that goes on within a party. In the case where the frontier
is linear, most extensive form bargaining procedures and bargaining solutions coincide (as Æ ! 1) with
the Nash solution in any case.
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Observation 1: If in the simple equilibrium of the game without parties i makes a
proposal to j, then the maximum (potential) surplus that i can get from a party with j
subject to j weakly preferring the party to the equilibrium outcome, is the same as the
surplus that i gets from this proposal over the expected continutation.
Observation 1 is based on the fact that in an equilibrium, when a legislator gets to
propose, he will choose a proposal that maximizes his surplus, subject to making another
legislator indierent between voting yes or no. This is the most that the legislator could
get from a party, subject to both members being above the disagreement point and helps
to dene the possibility set for the party.
Let us now return to analyzing the example with Observation 1 in hand.
Let us rst analyze the potential party of legislators 2 and 3.
Given observation 1, to identify the maximum potential surplus that could go to leg-
islator 2, we can examine the utility from the proposal y
23
; x
23
compared to the expected
equilibrium continuation. Here u
2
(y
23
; x
23
) = X
1
2
, so u
2
  v
2
= X. So if the party acted
purely in legislator 2's interest, subject to legislator 3 being as well o as without the
party, then it would improve legislator 2's payo by X. To nd out the most that party
f2; 3g could do for legislator 3 (subject to being above disagreement for legislator 2), we
nd the best proposal for 3 subject to u
2
 v
2
. In this case, a simple calculation shows
that y =
b
y
med
+
X
2
, x = (0; X; 0) is the best. This results in u
3
=  6 + 6
b
y
med
+ 3X. So
u
3
  v
3
= 2X.
Thus, the range of possible utility combinations that the party f2; 3g can generate
relative to the disagreement point of the stationary equilibrium without parties are pic-
tured in Figure 1. Applying, the Nash bargaining solution to this set results in a surplus
of
X
2
going to legislator 2, and X to legislator 3. This corresponds to having the party
f2; 3g make the proposal
21
y =
b
y
med
+
X
3
, x = (0; X; 0), and approving it.
Next we can analyze the potential party f1; 3g. Very similar calculations result in
X
6
going to legislator 1, and X to legislator 3. The party f1; 3g would make the proposal
y =
b
y
med
+
X
3
, x = (X; 0; 0), and approve it in equilibrium. Note that the proposal is
the same (except for X going to 1 instead of 2) as that in the party f2; 3g, because 3's
position is the constraining one in each of the party.
Finally, let us analyze the potential of party f1; 2g. The calculations of the frontier
are a bit more complicated in this case. First, using Observation 1, we can calculate
the maximal potential surplus for legislator 1, which is
2
3
X, obtained when y = y
12
,
x = x
12
. For player 2, the best that the party could do subject to 1 being as well o as
in disagreement is to propose, y =
b
y
med
, x = (X
1
2
; X
1
2
; 0), which results in a maximal
potential surplus for legislator 2 of X. However, in this case the possibility frontier is not
21
It is also possible to let the party randomize, with not changes in expected action or utility.
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linear. The frontier of utility combinations that the party f1; 2g can generate is found
by moving eÆciently between y = y
12
=
b
y
med
 
1
6
X, x = x
12
= (X; 0; 0) and y =
b
y
med
,
x = (
1
2
X;
1
2
X; 0). There is a kink at the point
b
y
med
, (X; 0; 0), as player 3 moving y down
from that point results in incremental losses to u
2
at the rate b
3
= 3, while moving x
2
up from that point increases u
2
only at a rate of 1. This is pictured in Figure 2. Nash
bargaining in this case leads to the surplus combination of
1
2
X to legislator 1, and
1
2
X
to legislator 2, which corresponds to the proposal
b
y
med
, (X; 0; 0).
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From these calculations, it follows that 1 strictly prefers party f1; 2g to f1; 3g, 2 is
indierent between parties f1; 2g and f2; 3g, and 3 is indierent between parties f1; 3g
and f2; 3g.
Relative to these preferences there are two stable parties: f1; 2g and f2; 3g. The party
f1; 3g is not stable as legislator 1 would prefer to change and form party f1; 2g.
Note that party behavior is distinguished from the non-party (or party-like) equilib-
rium behavior in terms of both actions and resulting utilities.
Next, let us reexamine Example 2 to see that the stable party structure depends on
the particulars of the situation.
Example 2 Revisited:
Based on a similar set of calculations as those described above, it follows that 1 strictly
prefers party f1; 2g to f1; 3g, 2 strictly prefers party f1; 2g to f2; 3g, and 3 is strictly
prefers party f1; 3g to f2; 3g.
Relative to these preferences there is a unique stable party: f1; 2g. Both legislators
2 and 3 have relatively strong ideological positions and would rather form a party with
legislator 1 than with each other. Legislator 1 gets more out of forming a party with
legislator 2 that is the unique party outcome.
Example 5 Revisited:
In this example simple calculations show that 1 is indierent between parties f1; 2g
and f1; 3g, 2 strictly prefers party f2; 3g to f1; 2g, and 3 is indierent between parties
f1; 3g and f2; 3g,
Relative to these preferences both parties f1; 3g and f2; 3g are possible stable party
structures.
22
In this case, no mixing is possible for the party given the kink at this point in the frontier, and so
this behavior is unique.
21
Most importantly, this example points out that it is possible for a party with disjoint
ideological positions, such as f1; 3g to be stable. Moreover, this is not simply in a
situation where all parties are stable as party f1; 2g is not stable.
Note, however, that the proposal that party f1; 3g would approve would be y =
b
y
med
+
1
2
X, x = (X; 0; 0), which diers from the simple equilibrium play in the absence
of a party, but is not an extreme position.
Generally, although parties have an impact and change predicted behavior relative
to an equilibrium without parties, that change is constrained by the comparisons to the
disagreement simple equilibrium outcome implicit in the formation of the party platform.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a model of legislative bargaining that extends the Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) model to include ideological considerations in a natural and tractable
way. These considerations are essential to developing a working of legislative decision
making, as well as understanding the workings of a legislature in a broader political
context. With this in mind, we have provided a series of results characterizing equilibrium
behavior.
We have also used the model for some simple examinations of the roles and forma-
tion of political parties. As seen in the examples in the last section, sharp predictions
concerning the constituency and position of stable political parties can be made in such
a model, and these depend on the particular ideological positions and intensities of the
legislators. This suggests that the methodology we have outlined here will be useful in
further analysis of the roles of political parties in legislative contexts.
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Appendix
Proof : Proof of Benchmark 3:
The rst part of the proposition is straightforward.
Consider the second part. Note that in a stationary equilibrium, either with prob-
ability 1 the game never terminates, or else with probability 1 the game terminates at
some nite date. To see this let a be the probability that the game terminates in the
rst session. If a = 0, then given stationarity the game never terminates. If a > 0, then
given stationarity the probability that the game lasts at least t sessions is (1  a)
t
which
converges to 0 as t becomes large.
Consider the possibility that in equilibrium no proposal is ever approved and the
default y
0
is the outcome with probability 1. If y
0
=
b
y
med
, then the conclusion of the
proposition is true. If y
0
<
b
y
med
(the case y
0
>
b
y
med
is analagous), then when the median
legislator is recognized and proposes
b
y
med
it will be approved by a majority (given the
continuation expectation of y
0
which must be worse for everyone to the right of (and
including) the median). Thus, the median should deviate and propose
b
y
med
which is a
contradiction.
Next, consider the possibility that some proposal is made and approved with positive
probability. Let y
min
be the lowest y and y
max
be the highest y which is approved with
positive probability in equilibrium.
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First, let us examine the case where y
min
6= y
max
. Note that y
1
 y
min
(and similarly
y
max
 y
n
), since otherwise y
1
could be proposed in place of y
min
and strictly preferred
by all, which contradicts the fact that y
min
is part of an equilibrium. Given that
n+1
2
legislators must approve a proposal to have it be an outcome, there exists a legislator
i who votes `yes' with positive probability for both of these proposals. Let v
i
denote
i's expected continuation utility from the equilibrium. This means that u
i
(y
min
)  v
i
and u
i
(y
max
)  v
i
. Given the single peaked preferences, this implies that u
i
(y)  v
i
for any y that is approved in equilibrium, and so by the denition of v
i
it follows that
u
i
(y
min
) = v
i
= u
i
(y
max
). It follows that y
min
<
b
y
i
< y
max
. It also follows that with
probability 1, one of these two proposals is approved (i.e., no other proposals are approved
since otherwise one of y
min
and y
max
would give i lower utility than the continuation).
Now we show that one of the two proposals is
b
y
med
. Suppose the contrary and, without
loss of generality, that u
med
(y
max
)  u
med
(y
min
). If the median proposes 
b
y
med
+(1 )y
max
23
These are well dened. There are at most two proposals that a player nds indierent to the
continuation, and then an interval over which they strictly prefer the proposal to the continuation, and
(at most) two intervals over which they strictly prefer the continuation to the proposal. Thus, there are
a nite set of intervals of proposals that will win the approval of a majority. An approved proposal must
maximize the expected utility of the proposer subject to being approved and there are a nite number
of solutions to this.
24
for small positive  it will be accepted. (For the case where y
max
<
b
y
med
legislators above
the median strictly prefer the new proposal to the continuation. For the case where
y
max
>
b
y
med
note that legislators whose peaks are at least as large as y
max
must have
u
j
(y
max
) > v
j
and so for small  it follows that u
j
(
b
y
med
+ (1   )y
max
) > v
j
. Others
who were voting `yes' for y
max
but have lower peaks below y
max
are made better o by
the change and will still vote `yes'.) This is a contradiction, and so the supposition was
wrong. Thus, say y
max
=
b
y
med
. It then follows that y
min
should never be approved,
since a majority (the median and above) prefer y
max
=
b
y
med
to y
min
<
b
y
med
. Thus, there
cannot be an equilibrium such that y
min
6= y
max
.
Next, let us examine the case where y
min
= y
max
. If y
min
6=
b
y
med
, then when the
median legislator is recognized the proposal
b
y
med
would be approved by a majority (given
the stationary continuation expectation of y
min
= y
max
which must be worse than
b
y
med
for a majority). Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium where y
min
= y
max
. We are left
with the case that y
min
= y
max
=
b
y
med
.
Proof : Proof of Lemma 6:
If Æ < 1, then to verify that a set of stationary strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium,
one needs only examine single stage deviations (xing the continuation expectation),
and so the conclusion of the lemma follows from standard arguments for upper-hemi
continuity of an equilibrium correspondence. (That is, given the continuity of u
i
(and
v
i
) it is clear that ` is still an equilibrium in the rst session given that agents expect
` to be the continuation.) For the case where Æ = 1 we also need to check that there is
no agent who can deviate in an innite number of sessions and be made better o. For
this to be possible, it must be that there is some i who is included in the proposal of
every j 6= i so that i can force the game to last an innite number of sessions by vetoing
every proposal. We can follow the same steps as the proof of Proposition 4 for d = 1 (see
below) to show there is a positive probability that some proposal is made and approved
which excludes i, and so given the stationarity of strategies, the game will end in nite
time regardless of i's actions.
Proof : Proof of Proposition 4:
We begin with the case of Æ = 1. Let v
j
denote the expected utility of legislator j in
the equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that i is included in (almost every) proposal.
Thus, u
i
(d)  v
i
for (almost every) d which is made and approved in equilibrium. This
implies that u
i
(d) = v
i
for almost every d.
Let d = (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) denote the expected proposal. By concavity u
j
(d)  v
j
for
all j. Suppose that x
j
> 0 for some j 6= i. Then i can propose (y; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) where
x
k
= x
k
+
x
j
n
1
for k 6= j. This will be approved and makes i strictly better o. which is a
contradiction. Thus x
j
= 0 for all j 6= i and so x
i
= X.
Since u
i
(d) = v
i
and x
i
= X for (almost every) d, it follows from single peaked
preferences that either y =
b
y
i
for every d or that there are exactly two decisions that are
approved in equilibrium with corresponding y
 
and y
+
. Consider the second case rst
25
and label the the decisions d
 
and d
+
where, without loss of generality, y
 
<
b
y
i
< y
+
.
Suppose that i  med (the other case is analagous). Consider C such that j 2 C have
u
j
(d
+
)  v
j
: For small  the proposal (y
+
  ; x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) would be approved by all
j 2 C (the only j to worry about are those with u
j
(d
+
) = v
j
, but this implies that also
u
j
(d
 
) = v
j
and so y
 
<
b
y
j
< y
+
). This is a contradiction. So consider the other case
where y =
b
y
i
and x
i
= X for every approved proposal. Any other agent could make
proposal (
b
y
i
;
X
n
; : : : ;
X
n
) which would be approved by a majority and strictly improving
for that majority, which is a contradiction. Thus our original supposition was wrong.
The existence of d < 1 with the claimed properties now follows from Lemma 1.
Proof : Proof of Proposition 2:
First, consider the case where Æ < 1.
We provide an outline of the proof. We rst represent the legislators' proposal strate-
gies (which have nite support) by a vector ` listing probabilities and proposals for each
legislator. Second, we dene the set of proposals a legislator i might make which would
be approved by a majority given that they expect ` to describe the continuation strate-
gies (and they expect this to be approved). We denote this set by A
 i
(`) and show
that it is a continuous correspondence which is nonempty and compact valued. We then
dene another correspondence mapping ` into best responses for each legislator - where
each legislator chooses proposals from A
 i
(`) to maximize u
i
. So, given ` we obtain a
set of best proposals that i can make and have approved given the expected continua-
tion `. This correspondence is denoted A

i
(`) and is upper-hemicontinous and nonempty,
compact and convex valued and thus has a xed point. We then verify that this xed
point represents the proposals each legislator makes which together with proper approval
strategies form the equilibrium.
As it may be that i randomizes over the C's that he or she proposes to, we keep track
of the strategy of proposals that i makes by a vector (d
iC
; 
iC
)
C
, where d
iC
is a proposal
that imakes and is approved by legislators in C (and perhaps others as well) and 
iC
is the
probability that this proposal made and
P
C

iC
= 1.
24
(See the proof of Proposition 3 to
verify that in equilibrium with probability 1 each i will make a proposal that is approved.)
Let L be the set of vectors (: : : ; d
iC
; 
iC
; : : :) 2 (D  [0; 1])
nM
, such that
P
C

iC
= 1 for
each i. For  2 [0; 1], ` = (: : : ; d
iC
; 
iC
; : : :) 2 L and
e
` = (: : : ;
e
d
iC
;
e

iC
; : : :) 2 L,
let ` = a` + (1   a)
e
` be the vector with entries d
iC
=
a
iC
d
iC
+(1 a)e
iC
e
d
iC
a
iC
+(1 a)e
iC
(provided
a
iC
+(1 a)
e

iC
> 0, and d
iC
= ad
iC
+(1 a)
e
d
iC
otherwise) and 
ic
= a
iC
+(1 a)
e

iC
.
25
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Although in some cases i may choose to randomize over an innite number of proposals, we show
that there always exists an equilibrium where at most a nite number of proposals are approved and so
this construction will suÆce.
25
This denition of a convex combination of elements in L ensures that if 
iC
= 0 and e
iC
> 0 then
the new proposal to C is still
e
d
iC
, as it should be.
26
For any ` 2 L, let E[`] 2 D be dened by
E[`] =
X
i
p
i
 
X
C

iC
d
iC
!
;
v
j
(`) =
X
i
p
i
 
X
C

iC
u
j
(d
iC
)
!
and
A
i
(`) = fd 2 D : u
i
(d)  Æv
i
(`)g:
The set A
i
(`) is the set of acceptable decisions for i (ones that i will approve) when i
expects ` to describe the continuation. Note that the correspondence A
i
(`) is nonempty,
compact valued, and continuous in `. Nonemptiness follows since by concavity u
i
(E[`]) 
Æv
i
(`) and so E[`] 2 A
i
(`). Compactness follows from the fact that A
i
(`) is closed (by the
continuity of u
i
) and a subset of a compact space. Continuity follows from the continuity
of u
i
and v
i
, and the fact that u
i
is locally non-satiated except at y =
b
y
i
and x
i
= X.
26
Let
A
C
(`) = \
j2C
A
j
(`)
and
A
 i
(`) = [
fC:i=2C;#C
n 1
2
g
A
C
(`):
Thus, A
C
(`) is the set of decisions that would be approved by a group C, and A
 i
(`) is the
set of decisions that i can make that would be approved by at least (n 1)=2 other agents.
Note that A
 i
(`) is nonempty, compact valued, and continuous in `. Nonemptiness
follows from the fact that E[`] 2 A
j
(`) for each j 6= i. Compactness follows from the
compactness of each A
j
and the nite number of unions and intersections. To establish
continuity, since upper hemicontinuity follows from the continuity of each A
j
, we need
only check lower hemicontinuity of each A
C
(`) (since lower hemicontinuity is preserved
under unions, but not necessarily under intersections). Consider `
n
! ` and d 2 A
C
(`).
We show that 9d
n
2 A
C
(`
n
) such that d
n
! d along a subsequence, to establish the
claim. Since Æ < 1 it follows that u
j
(E[`]) > Æv
j
(`), and so u
j
(E[`]) > Æv
j
(`
n
) for large
enough n. Let d
k
= a
k
E[`] + (1  a
k
)d, where a
k
! 0. It follows that for each k we can
nd n
k
such that u
j
(d
k
) > Æv
j
(`
n
) for all j 2 C and n  n
k
. Choosing successively larger
n
k
for each d
k
provides the required subsequence.
Let A

i
(`) = argmax
d2A
 i
(`)
u
i
(d). By Berge's Maximum Theorem, A

i
(`) is nonempty,
compact valued, and upper-hemicontinuous. Finally, let H(`) = f
e
` 2 L :
e

iC
> 0 )
e
d
iC
2 A

i
(`)g. Thus, H maps a given expectated continuation ` into the best response
strategy proles, where each legislator i is choosing a best proposal subject to winning
approval (or randomizing over a nite number of such proposals). By the properties of
each A

i
, it follows that H is nonempty, compact valued, and upper-hemicontinuous. Also
note that by the concavity of u
i
, H(`) is convex valued.
27
Thus, there exists a xed point
of H by Kakutani's xed point theorem.
26
This rules out `thick' indierence sets (with nonempty interiors) and establishes lower hemicontinuity.
27
Each A
C
(`) is convex valued and so if d and d
0
both maximize u
i
overA
C
(`) then so does ad+(1 a)d
0
and so by the denition of L the convexity of H(`) follows.
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Let ` = (: : : ; d
iC
; 
iC
; : : :) be such a xed point. Dene stationary strategies as follows:
When i is recognized, i makes proposal d
iC
with probability 
iC
. Note that for any i, each
d
iC
such that 
iC
> 0 is such that u
i
(d
iC
) > Æv
i
(`) since i could make propsal E[`], and
so u
i
(d
iC
)  u
i
(E[`]) > Æv
i
(`). When i is called on to vote for a proposal d, i approves
d if and only if u
i
(d)  Æv
i
(`). By the construction of A

i
these constitute a stationary
equilibrium, as given Æ < 1 and the stationarity we need only to check that no agent
wants to deviate in the rst session.
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Next, consider the case where Æ = 1. We verify that there exists an equilibrium by
verifying that a sequence of equilibria corresponding to discount factors Æ
k
! 1 has a
convergent subsequence which is an equilibrium when Æ = 1. This follows from Lemma
6.
Proof : Proof of Proposition 1
The case of Æ < 1 is straightforward, so consider the case of Æ = 1. Note that some
agent can make a proposal that would be better for a majority than the status quo, so
the stationary equilibrium must have some proposal approved with positive probability.
If the equilibrium has only dimensions approved together, then it must end in the rst
session, as Proposition 4 then applies. So, suppose that there is a positive probability
that a proposal is approved which involves only one dimension.
Case 1: The dimension is Y . Let the proposer be i and the proposal y. Let C be the
set of legislators voting `yes'. The continuation expectation has some distribution over
x
j
's and some expected x
j
, where
P
j
x
j
= 1 and x
j
> 0 for all j. (The game is then
essentially a Baron and Ferejohn game, and so all agents must have a positive payo in
equilibrium.) Legislator i can make all agents in C better o by proposing y; x where
x
j
= x
j
+
P
k=2C[i
x
k
(n+1)=2
for j 2 C [ i, which would be approved, which is a contradiction.
Case 2: The dimension is X. the continuation expectation is for
b
y
med
to be approved.
Thus, if a proposal of a single dimension is approved, it must be the distributive
dimension and then an expectation of
b
y
med
for the future. Note that in this case, there
is still some agent excluded from the X split and so the approval must be in the rst
period (by the same reasoning as Propositions 4 and 3).
Proof : Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose that every proposal has the same y approved. Let
b
x
i
be the expected private
good that each legislator gets in equilibrium. By Benchmark 1 it follows that
b
x
i
=
X
n
.
Suppose without loss of generality that y 
b
y
med
. Consider the case where y <
b
y
med
and
consider a coalition C of legislators with
b
y
i

b
y
med
, and some j 2 C. Agent j must be
making an approved proposal with y and x
j
= X   Æ
(n 1)X
2n
in equilibrium.
29
Instead, j
28
The single deviation property holds according to standard arguments since Æ < 1.
29
This follows from a standard argument in bargaining games: By oering y and slightly more than
Æ
(n 1)X
2n
to
n 1
2
other legislators, the proposal would be approved and would oer j a utility higher than
28
can propose
b
y
med
and x
i
= Æ
X
n
for i 2 C, i 6= j, which would be approved since all i 2 C
would be better o than in the continuation, which is a contradiction. Thus, y =
b
y
med
.
So, consider C from the denition of preferences that admit local compromise. Find
 such that ju
i
(y)   u
i
(
b
y
med
)j < Æ
X
n
for each i 2 C and y such that jy  
b
y
med
j < .
Pick some j 2 C, and consider the case where j is called on to propose. Agent j
must be making an approved proposal with y =
b
y
med
and x
j
= X   Æ
(n 1)X
2n
. Since
preferences admit local compromise, it follows that there exists jy 
b
y
med
j < , such that
P
i2C
u
i
(y) >
P
i2C
u
i
(
b
y
med
). Let 
i
= u
i
(y)  u
i
(
b
y
med
). It follows that from our choice of
 above, that j
i
j < Æ
X
n
. Let j propose y and x
i
= Æ
X
n
 
i
+ for each i 2 C, i 6= j. This
leaves each i 2 C, i 6= j better o than the continuation for positive . It also follows
that for small enough 
u
j
(y) +X  
X
i2C;i6=j
x
i
> u
j
(
b
y
med
) +X   Æ
(n  1)X
2n
:
This is a contradiction, because by deviating and proposing the suggested y and x
i
's, the
proposal would be approved and j would be better o.
Proof : Proof of Proposition 3:
For the case of Æ < 1 this is clear since any proposer has the potential to make a proposal
that makes all agents better o than the expected continuation. For the case where Æ = 1,
this follows from Proposition 4 and the fact that any proposer thus has the potential to
make a proposal that makes some exact majority (including him or herself) strictly better
o than the continuation.
Let us verify that X is distributed to an exact majority in an approved decision.
Suppose to the contrary. Consider an exact majority C, including the proposer, that
weakly prefers the approved decision y; x to the continuation. (Such a group exists, or
the sequential voting in a subgame perfect equilibrium would have led to disapproval
of the proposal.) The proposer could make a proposal that makes all legislators in C
strictly better o by proposing y and
b
x where
b
x
j
= x
j
+
P
i=2C
x
i
(n+1)=2
for j 2 C and
b
x
j
= 0
for j =2 C. This would be approved, and so the proposer's decision could not have been
a best response which is a contradiction.
Let us check that the equilibrium is independent of the default. Consider any sta-
tionary equilibrium. Given the rst point, every recognized proposer must be making
a proposal that is approved in the rst session. Change the default decision. This is
still an equilibrium: given the stationary strategies the continuation expectation is the
same. There are no innite strategy deviations by any single legislator that could lead
the continuation. Thus, j can make a proposal that would be accepted and oer j a utility higher than
the continuation, and so j must be making some approved proposal in equilibrium or there would be an
improving deviation. The only candidate for such a proposal is to have j oering exactly Æ
(n 1)X
2n
to the
other agents, since relative to any proposal where j oers more, j could do better by oering slightly
less and still have it approved.
29
to the default, since with probability 1 the game will end in nite time independent of
the deviation (as the legislator is excluded from at least one approved proposal).
Characterization of Equilibria for Examples 1 to 4:
30
Case 1: b
2
 3b
1
.
In this case, legislator 1 always proposes to legislator 2, legislator 3 always proposes
to legislator 1, and legislator 2 mixes over proposing to the other two.
Let y
ij
; x
ij
denote the decision proposed by i when proposing to j, and a
i
j denote the
probability that i proposes to j.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
y
12
=
b
y
med
 X
3(b
2
)
2
 3(b
1
)
2
b
2
A
, x
12
= (X; 0; 0)
y
21
=
b
y
med
x
21
= (X(
5b
1
b
2
+(b
2
)
2
A
); X
6b
2
b
1
+6(b
1
)
2
A
; 0) a
21
=
3(b
1
)
2
 4b
1
b
2
+b
2
2
b
2
(5b
1
+b
2
)
y
23
=
b
y
med
+X
b
2
+5b
1
A
x
23
= (0; X; 0) a
23
= 1  a
21
y
31
=
b
y
med
+X
6b
2
+6b
1
A
x
31
= (X; 0; 0)
where A = 6(b
1
)
2
+ 11b
1
b
2
+ (b
2
)
2
Case 2:
1+
p
5
2
b
1
 b
2
< 3b
1
.
Legislator 1 always proposes to legislator 2, legislator 3 mixes over proposing to the
other two, and legislator 2 mixes over proposing to the other two.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
y
12
=
b
y
med
 X
6(b
2
)
2
 6b
1
b
2
 6(b
1
)
2
b
2
A
, x
12
= (X; 0; 0)
y
21
=
b
y
med
x
21
= (X(
4b
1
b
2
+2(b
2
)
2
A
); X
2b
1
b
2
+6(b
1
)
2
A
; 0) a
21
=
3(b
1
)
2
+2b
1
b
2
 (b
2
)
2
b
2
(2b
1
+b
2
)
y
23
=
b
y
med
+X
2b
2
 4b
1
A
x
23
= (0; X; 0) a
23
= 1  a
21
y
31
=
b
y
med
+X
8b
2
+6b
1
A
x
31
= (X; 0; 0)
y
32
=
b
y
med
+X
8b
2
+6b
1
A
x
32
= (0; X; 0)
where A = 6(b
1
)
2
+ 12b
1
b
2
+ 2(b
2
)
2
30
For these to be equilibria it must be that X is small enough so that 0  y
ij
 1 for each ij.
Corresponding bounds on X follow directly from the given expressions.
30
Case 3: b
2
<
1+
p
5
2
b
1
.
Legislator 1 always proposes to legislator 2, legislator 3 mixes over proposing to the
other two, and legislator 2 mixes over proposing to the other two.
The specics of this equilibrium are:
y
12
=
b
y
med
, x
12
= (X
b
1
b
2
+2(b
2
)
2
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
; X
(b
1
)
2
+b
1
b
2
 (b
2
)
2
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
; 0)
y
21
=
b
y
med
x
21
= (X(
(b
2
)
2
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
); X
(b
1
)
2
+2b
1
b
2
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
; 0) a
21
=
b
1
b
2
y
23
=
b
y
med
+X
b
2
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
x
23
= (0; X; 0) a
23
=
b
2
 b
1
b
2
y
31
=
b
y
med
+X
2b
2
+b
1
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
x
31
= (X; 0; 0) a
31
=
b
2
b
1
+b
2
y
32
=
b
y
med
+X
2b
2
+b
1
(b
1
+b
2
)
2
x
32
= (0; X; 0) a
32
=
b
1
b
1
+b
2
Proposals are independent of b
3
. Since b
3
is highest, 3 never keeps any X, so the scale
of b
3
does not change 3's relative rankings of the proposals.
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